Historical Determination of the Norms of Science: Between What Is and What Is Due

Abstract

The article deals with the issue of the difference between the interpretations of the scientific norm as a regulator of the reproduction process of the studied object and the norm fixing the significance of the professional activity of the sci­entist. According to the author, the appeal to the method of comparative histori­cal analysis avoids the extremes of this division in the description of the norm. Using the example of the classical picture of the world, formed under the influ­ence of physics by I. Newton, the mutual determination of the methodological and social aspects of the normativity of science in the aspect of studying the specifics of the objects under study is demonstrated. It is shown that the ana­lysis of the norm, based on the characteristics given by the scientific picture of the world, can lead to erroneous conclusions. The author notes that the scien­tific picture of the world, acting as an ontological scheme, not only captures the characteristics of objects, but also assumes the presence of true methods leading to obtaining reliable knowledge. Thus, it includes an element of normativity, re­placing the actual given with the proper one. The rejection of the schematism of the scientific picture of the world and the appeal to the study of the diver­sity of unique practical situations serves as the basis for the study of normati­vity in science in the aspect of a specific historical epoch. The author notes the prospects of turning to the activity approach in philosophy, the reinterpreta­tion of which in the light of the modern understanding of the concept of activity, could clarify the understanding of the phenomenon of the scientific norm. It is emphasized that the modern interpretation of activity presupposes overcoming the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy and focuses on its collective nature. Such an interpretation of activity does not mean a rejection of the norm as an objective characteristic of the object, but assumes the object as a result of the collective ac­tivity of the scientific community.