Herbart’s Epistemological Model and Its Influence on The Forming of Neo-Kantian Programs of Philosophy

Abstract

The theoretical heritage of J.F. Herbart is still an underinvestigated page in the history of world philosophical thought. The epistemological component of his works has not been the object of close attention until now, and the appeal to Herbart’s texts was carried out mainly in the context of Herbertarian pedagogy. The article is devoted to the epistemological model of Herbart and its influence on the formation of the neo-Kantian program of philosophy at the end of the 19th century. It is suggested that Herbart anticipated neo-Kantian attempts to sci­entize philosophy by proposing modeling as a method of constructing a philo­sophical theory: Herbart’s program was based on the mathematical method and consistent deterministic construction. The article also emphasizes that Herbart’s concept provided a reliable basis for the central problems of neo-Kantian thought: discussions about extensive and intensive quantities, their measurabil­ity, infinitesimal magnitude, mechanistic theory of perception, the requirement to translate philosophical concepts into the language of mathematics as a source of verification of the entire theory. Herbart identified a significant array of factual material, concentrated around the mechanics of cognition, and demonstrated a new for his time way of working with a text, the analysis of which was based not on a reference to the “historical” Kant, his vision or language, but modeling and the corresponding redefinition of the basic provisions of the entire system. Even though neo-Kantians criticized Herbart’s conclusions, his mathematical psychology became an essential consolidating factor for the emergence of the Marburg school.