Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Part II

Abstract

This is the second part of the article devoted to the approach to the problem of consciousness, which is called illusionism. Illusionism claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory, because conscious experience is misrepresented as having phenomenal properties. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of con­sciousness with the problem of illusion. In this part, special attention is paid to the justification of illusionism and pointing out its advantages over radical and conservative realism. The critical part does not aim to refute the mentioned ap­proaches or provide a definitive argument for illusionism, but to show that such a view has its own strengths, and following the illusionist position can have its own prospects. In addition, this part presents several positive argu­ments in favor of illusionism, demonstrating that liberation from the meta­physical framework of realism can give a new impetus to the philosophy of consciousness. As a response to criticism, the article considers arguments often cited as reproaches to illusionists. Among these arguments are the accusation that illusionism does not take into account the immediate data of conscious­ness; the indication of the gap between illusion and reality that needs to be filled, as well as the problem of the Cartesian theater – the inner viewer, which distorts experience, forcing us to believe the existence of a phenomenal consciousness.