Hard Problem of Illusion

Abstract

The hard problem of consciousness, which consists in the need for a non-func­tional explanation of subjective experience as a possibility to have subjective ex­perience at all, while focusing on attempts to give this explanation, often loses sight of consciousness itself and its phenomenality, the real way of existence of which is assumed as a given. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of con­sciousness with the problem of illusion, which implies the need to explain how and why judgments about phenomenal consciousness are possible. Thus, illu­sionism as a theory of consciousness looks primarily at consciousness itself, tak­ing into account another possibility of explaining its existence – an illusion, a be­lief caused by the disposition to form such a belief and its formation in the course of introspective distortion of internal states during the process of their representation. That is, the internal states themselves are not illusory – they exist. But we systematically distort them. In this regard, qualia, along with conscious­ness, become an illusion, which is formed by a person based on these disposi­tions, which determine the qualitative part of our perception. Illusionism can be­come a tool for explaining not only the possibilities of qualia, but also why they are largely individual.