Classical and Communicative Sign Models in Explanation of the Grelling – Nelson Paradox Part II

Abstract

К. Grelling – L. Nelson’s paradox arises if the author (authors) and the addressee (addressees) use the classical linguistic model of meaning formation, which pos­tulates that self-referential signs (words), or modules “form – meaning”, are em­ployed and understood in word-containing semiotic procedures. The commu­nicative model of meaning formation, on the contrary, states the impossibility of an autonomous reference of a sign, considers an attempt at indirect influence (i.e., process) as the only possible object of reference and understanding in a given communicative act, recognizes the actional (“influential”) mode of semi­otic actor’s consciousness as the exclusive source of the produced “meaning”, including of sign reference. The paradox is viewed as a sequence of attempts at communicative influences on a conceivable addressee who understands (ap­proves or disapproves) the actions of the author of the paradox by considering his “influential” cognitive states: on which objects the author focuses the ad­dressee’s attention, what are the denotations hidden by the author behind the “bodies” of signs, how justified the established classes, relationships, links, etc. The main vulnerability of the paradox is proposed to be seen in the fact that the author unjustifiably recognizes the independent out-of-communicative ability of a sign (word) to produce influences (to name, to describe, to have its own prop­erties), does not notice the communicative constants of meaning formation in the theoretical field, although inevitably uses them practically. The paradox is elimi­nated together with the removal of the classical concept of a sign as an autono­mous module “form – meaning”.