Presupposition of the Epoche and Neutralization of Experience: Terms and Problems

Abstract

The article reveals several presuppositions of the basic procedure of the phe­nomenological method, designated by Husserl as epoche, or phenomenological reduction. The methodological basis of the study is the distinction between terms, concepts, and problems, as well as the combination of conceptual and ter­minological analysis, which is mainly realized on the basis of the first two major works of Husserl Logical Investigations (LI) and Ideas of pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy (Ideas I). Husserl’s attempts to present feel­ing-volitional elements as prerequisites for an epoche are analyzed. In this re­spect, the author examines the influence of Brentano’s ethical teaching on Husserl, as well as various interpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology in Rus­sian philosophy (Gustav Shpet, Lev Shestov, Yakov Druskin). Brentano’s doc­trine of representation as a primary mental phenomenon is considered as the starting point of Husserl’s attempt to describe in LI a “simple representation” as a definite experience. The function of the term neutralization in Husserl’s con­cept of noetic-noematic structures and its correspondence to the term simple rep­resentation becomes the subject of the study. The way towards the epoche as a conception of the method is interpreted as a turn from neutralization of any
positions in the world to neutralization of the existence of the world itself.
The author comes to the conclusion that Husserl’s presupposition and model for such a turn is mathematics and science as a theory. In general, as a term epoche indicates various types of experience along with presuppositions that are not re­alized in experience; as a conception epoche proves to be a loosely connected set of volitional, ethical and cognitively neutral elements.