Classical and Communicative Sign Models in Explanation of the Grelling – Nelson Paradox Part I

Abstract

К.Grelling – L.Nelson’s paradox arises if the author (authors) and the addressee (addressees) use the classical linguistic model of meaning formation, which pos­tulates that self-referential signs (words), or modules “form – meaning”, are em­ployed and understood in word-containing semiotic procedures. The commu­nicative model of meaning formation, on the contrary, states the impossibility of an autonomous reference of a sign, considers an attempt at indirect influence (i.e., process) as the only possible object of reference and understanding in a given communicative act, recognizes the actional (“influential”) mode of semiotic ac­tor’s consciousness as the exclusive source of the produced “meaning”, includ­ing of sign reference. The paradox is viewed as a sequence of attempts at com­municative influences on a conceivable addressee who understands (approves or disapproves) the actions of the author of the paradox by considering his “influen­tial” cognitive states: on which objects the author focuses the addressee’s atten­tion, what are the denotations hidden by the author behind the “bodies” of signs, how justified the established classes, relationships, links, etc. The main vulnera­bility of the paradox is proposed to be seen in the fact that the author unjustifi­ably recognizes the independent out-of-communicative ability of a sign (word) to produce influences (to name, to describe, to have its own properties), does not notice the communicative constants of meaning formation in the theoretical field, although inevitably uses them practically. The paradox is eliminated to­gether with the removal of the classical concept of a sign as an autonomous module “form – meaning”.