The Problem of Disagreement and Fields of Sense:Epistemological Implicationsof Markus Gabriel’s Ontological Pluralism

Abstract

The paper considers the problem of knowing things starting with pyrrhonical skeptical argumentation that puts the problem of disagreement in accounts of things. The problem is rooted in ontology and metaphysics taken classically as knowledge of being as far as it is being. The first part deals with the pyrrhonical problem of disagreement that rests on ontological picture of “nature of things” which launches epistemological obstacles. The second part sketches Markus Gabriel’s ontological theory, particularly his notion of “existence” and rejection of metaphysics as self-contradictory ontology of totality. His theory states a plu­rality of “fields of sense” that accommodate seemingly contradictory predicates. In the third part, I point out to epistemological implications of Gabriel’s theory that promise to solve the problem by rejecting a concealed assumption that brings the problem into life. This secures knowledge of things depending on dis­tribution of contradictory features of things into different fields of sense. Also it will be shown why Gabriel cannot be labelled as a constructivist and a relativist.