Thematisation of Passivity in Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Problem of the Intersubjective World

Abstract

The problem of passive constitution in E. Husserl’s phenomenology is worthy of being put emphasis on, since passive constitution, contrasted with an active con­scious constitution, should be reckoned among the focal points of philosophy of the 20th century. Thematisation of the sphere of passivity, as such, is related to solving the problem of intersubjectivity. Elaboration of the problem of intersub­jectivity means for phenomenology not a response to an externally cast reproach “in solipsism”. It represents an internal theme of phenomenology as such. Husserl aspired to substantiate the phenomenological science as being significant to everybody. But in order to make this science significant, i.e. make it necessary for all others, it was primarily necessary to prove the existence of these other Selves or of the transcendental subjects. The author elaborates upon the history of consideration given to the problem of intersubjectivity by Husserl, in order to clarify the way the attempts of solving the problem of intersubjectivity, based on the activity of the Self, led to an egocentric model, and, in its turn, the demand for overcoming such model led to thematisation of the genesis of subjectivity and the detection of passivity as the very basis of such genesis. The author of the article will turn to the concept of primary subjectivity, or Ur-Ich, in order to bring into focus the methodological significance of distinguishing the proto-Self for the substantiation of intersubjectivity.