The Logic of Concept in Hegel’s Philosophy (to the Materialistic Apology of Hegelian Philosophy)

Abstract

The article conducts the thought that the usual form of interpreting Hegelian phi­losophy as idealistic philosophy is an abstractly one-sided, obviously incom­plete, view of the system of this philosophy. The author shows that Hegel pro­ceeds from being in the definition of a concept and in building of a universal image of logic, begins with being and ends with being expressed in the concept. This is based on Hegel's logical representations, in which behind the logic lies, on the one hand, the historical subject-transformative activity, and, on the other hand, the historical logic of identifying mental forms. The principle of the iden­tity of being and thinking, dating back to antiquity, indicates the necessity to see the dialectics of the material and the ideal in historical being, and the concept as knowledge of the essence of this being is derived by Hegel only from being. Logic is the movement of an understanding ability from being to the idea, which is the transition to being, where the concept realizes itself in the reality of object-transformative activity. The article emphasizes that this circle is a usual scheme which can be observed in all forms of human activity. And God, interpreted as an ideal beginning, according to Hegel completely coincides with the logical process, which expresses the movement of the reality content. The author aims to demonstrate that it is unacceptable to regard and to evaluate Hegel's philoso­phy in the usual thinking stereotypes that break the deep meaning of its consis­tent logic.