Functionalism as a Scientific Approach to Consciousness: why Qualia Arguments can’t be Decisive

Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyze anti-functionalist arguments in philosophy of mind and to show that there is a common intuition underlying both physicalist and anti-physicalist arguments. Both physicalists and anti-physicalists presuppose that two physical systems can be functionally identical, but different in respect to possessing consciousness. However, this intuition is precisely what functionalists contest. Therefore anti-functionalist arguments can only be successful if there would be given at least one scientifically plausible thought experiment showing what such system might possibly look like. The article is concluded with the analysis of Ned Block’s famous thought experiment of a Chinese nation, which collectively governs a brainless body. This analysis is intended to show that this system will not be functionally identical to a human body and therefore it cannot be used as a decisive argument against functionalism.