Субъективность и единство самости в феноменологической перспективе

Abstract

The main motivation of this work consists in possibility to account for the problem of
subjective identity as constituted on the level preceding narrative and refl ective self-conceptions.
To this purpose, I consider phenomenological notion of subjectivity in its relation to the unity of
experience as an open totality. The link between unity and subjective character of experience is
analyzed (1) on the example of the conception of formal unity in Husserl’s early work Logical
Investigations; and then, after acknowledgment of certain limitations of this approach for the
principal heterogeneity of subjectivity, (2) on the example of the contemporary phenomenological
theory of the minimal self. It is underscored that the limits of the formal theory of subjective
unity provoke us to conceive such a theory which could account for the subjective identity as
constituted on the pre-cognitive and pre-refl ective level of our affective and embodied being in
the world.