Mengzi and Gaozi on the Concept of Xing: Two Perspectives on the Vital Centre

Abstract

The article discusses the passage 6.1.3 of Mengzi, which is crucial for clarifying the meaning of the concept of xing. The existing interpretations, taking xing as “nature” and sheng as “life” or “innate”, fail to explain Gaozi’s silence and to figure out what Mengzi’s questions serve. One has to choose: either Gaozi’s position is completely wrong and Mengzi’s questions open Gaozi’s eyes, causing his confusion, or Gaozi’s position is plausible and the confusion is caused by the fact that Mengzi’s questions are a sophism. The author comes to the fol­lowing conclusions: 1) xing is not “nature” or a name of essential properties etc., but a physical object that serves as the vital centre; 2) Mengzi’s first question clarifies that for Gaozi xing is a viable object within a living being, 3) with the last two questions, Mengzi problematizes Gaozi’s position and marks a basic disagreement with him, rather than confusing him: Mengzi does not agree that xing as a necessary cause of a living being’s life can be, by analogy with bai, “white”, understood also as a universal cause.