The Doctrine of Phronesis as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Ethics

Abstract

Aristotle’s ethical reasoning is based on the concept of happiness. According to Aristotle, it is possible to achieve a happy state, which is the goal of all hu­man aspirations, thanks to the activity of the mind. The article is devoted to the study of the concept of intelligent human activity, presented by Aristotle in the form of a trinity combining theory, practice and creativity, realized through the intellectual virtues of a rational soul. The article shows that, devel­oping Plato’s doctrine of the division of the soul, Aristotle formulates a non-Platonic conclusion that knowledge and virtue should not be considered identi­cal. The division of the rational soul into two components, one of which is en­gaged in contemplation of immobile eternal existence, and the other in know­ledge of the changeable world, presupposes a difference in the possibilities of intellectual virtues. The article explores the advantages of theoretical reason (σοφία) and practical reason (φρόνησις), examines the important role of a char­acteristic and integral feature of the human soul – desire, which must have the status of reasonableness in order to realize the possibility of achieving moral perfection. The subject of this study is practical reason. Analyzing the na­ture and status of intellectual virtues in Ethica Nicomachea, lib. VI, the author comes to the conclusion that the decisive role in the process of achieving hu­man happiness belongs to φρόνησις. The theory of excellent behavior, created by Aristotle, is quite applicable in practice, provided that a person possesses φρόνησις. Happiness is possible if a person realizes the unique ability to think intelligently and act according to reason.